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ABSTRACT ResearchonH5N1inﬂuenzaviruseshasreceivedmuchattentionrecentlyduetothepossibledangersassociatedwith
newlydevelopedavianH5N1virusesthatwerederivedfromhighlypathogenicavianvirusesandarenowtransmissibleamong
ferretsviarespiratorydroplets.Anappropriatediscussion,basedonscientiﬁcfactsabouttherisksthatsuchvirusesposeandon
thebiocontainmentfacilitiesandpracticesnecessaryforworkingsafelywiththeseviruses,isneeded.Selectingtherightlevelof
biocontainmentiscriticalforminimizingtherisksassociatedwithH5N1researchwhilesimultaneouslyallowinganappropri-
atelyfastpaceofdiscovery.Rationalcountermeasuresforpreventingthespreadofinﬂuenzacanbedevelopedonlybygaininga
thoroughknowledgeofthemolecularmechanismsatworkinhostspeciﬁcityandtransmission.
I
nﬂuenza A viruses continue to pose a major concern for animal
and human health. These viruses infect a variety of species, in-
cluding aquatic birds, poultry, pigs, horses, dogs, and humans,
causingsigniﬁcantmorbidityandmortality.Inthecaseofhuman
inﬂuenza viruses, in addition to the burden of yearly epidemics,
there is the ever-present threat of an inﬂuenza pandemic. Pan-
demics occur when a novel strain of inﬂuenza virus of animal
origin evolves the ability to infect and efﬁciently transmit among
humans. While some inﬂuenza pandemics, like the 1918 H1N1
pandemic that killed more than 40 million people worldwide,
have had devastating consequences, others, including the H1N1
pandemic in 2009, which resulted in an estimated 18,000 deaths,
have been considerably milder. Unfortunately, the emergence of
newhumanpandemicviruses,aswellasthesubtypeandvirulence
of the causative viruses, is still unpredictable. Although there are
vaccinesavailableforcertaininﬂuenzaviruses,theyarestrainspe-
ciﬁc, and the generation and general distribution of a new inﬂu-
enza virus vaccine take more time than the spread of a new virus,
severely limiting the impact of vaccines in the ﬁrst wave of a pan-
demic. Inﬂuenza antiviral drugs are of broader speciﬁcity, but
resistancetothosedrugsandproblemswithavailabilitylimittheir
use.
In order to mitigate the possible impact of an inﬂuenza pan-
demic,weneedmoreresearchanddevelopmentinthegeneration
of improved vaccines and antivirals with broad cross-reactivity
against multiple inﬂuenza viruses. In addition, by investigating
the factors responsible for the generation of human pandemic
viruses, we can better recognize the risks that animal inﬂuenza
virus strains pose to humans and build eradication campaigns to
target speciﬁc viral strains circulating in animals. Critical to this
issue is the question of what makes an inﬂuenza virus transmissi-
ble in humans and animals. We know very little about this ques-
tion.Abetterunderstandingofinﬂuenzatransmissionwillleadto
the development of countermeasures for viral transmission that
can enhance our pandemic preparedness plans.
Ferrets and guinea pigs are often used as animal models of
inﬂuenzavirustransmission.Severalmutationsandchangesasso-
ciated with increased airborne transmission of avian inﬂuenza vi-
ruses in ferrets have been identiﬁed in recent years (1–3). How-
ever, previous attempts to identify adaptive changes in highly
pathogenicavianH5N1virusesassociatedwithtransmissionhave
failed, supporting the possibility that H5N1 viruses might be
structurallyunﬁtformammaliantransmission(4).Morerecently,
twoindependentlaboratoriesleadbyRonFouchierandYoshihiro
Kawaoka have ruled out this hypothesis and identiﬁed speciﬁc
mutations that allow the H5N1 virus to accomplish airborne
transmission in ferrets (unpublished observations). While this
provides important information on the adaptability of H5N1 vi-
ruses, more research needs to be conducted to understand the
possibility that avian H5N1 could evolve to become transmissible
in humans, to predict its pathogenesis in humans, and to ﬁnd the
molecular mechanisms responsible for host speciﬁcity in inﬂu-
enza virus transmission.
While research on inﬂuenza virus transmission is critical for
ﬁndingwaystobettertacklethispathogen,itisimportanttocon-
duct such research using appropriate biocontainment and bio-
safety conditions to minimize possible risks of virus release to the
environment.Riskassessmentisacrucialtoolinselectingbiocon-
tainment levels for research on potentially dangerous pathogens.
According to the Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Lab-
oratories (BMBL) manual (5), the deﬁnitive reference book for
biosafety issues, biological risk associated with pathogen research
is determined by three elements: the activities that can result in
human exposure to the pathogen, the probability that such expo-
sure would cause an infection, and the consequences of such an
infection. Although ferret-adapted H5N1 viruses probably have
attenuated infectivity and pathogenesis for humans, to minimize
all possible risks one should use biocontainment facilities and
practices that prevent human exposure. Preventing the escape of
viruses from the laboratory can be achieved by housing research
activities in a facility equipped with interlocked rooms with neg-
ative pressure and high-efﬁciency particulate air (HEPA) ﬁltered
aircirculationandusingtheappropriatedecontaminationand/or
sterilization practices for material leaving the facility. Since hu-
man infection with inﬂuenza viruses occurs via the respiratory
route, infection of laboratory personnel can be prevented by the
use of powered air-purifying respirators. These practices corre-
spond to enhanced biosafety level 3 (BSL3), as described in the
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an enhanced BSL3 facility can be minimized by vaccinating per-
sonnel with an H5N1 vaccine and through the use of antiviral
drugs.
Increased biocontainment, or BSL4, is generally restricted to
dangerous pathogens for which neither therapeutics nor vaccines
areavailable.H5N1viruses,ontheotherhand,aresensitivetothe
antivirals zanamivir and oseltamivir, and infection with the virus
is preventable by vaccination with the H5N1 inactivated vaccine.
Inﬂuenza virus research is important for the development of
novel intervention strategies for preventing and mitigating inﬂu-
enza epidemics and pandemics. As scientists, we have the respon-
sibility to avoid the undue restrictions of the highest level of bio-
containment if enhanced BSL3 facilities can provide the
appropriate biosafety. The use of BSL4 containment would not
decrease the risk of virus release any more than enhanced BSL3
containment, but it would result in an unnecessary burden that
would restrict research on H5N1 inﬂuenza transmission to a few
facilities and considerably decrease the speed of research on this
important pathogen.
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